The Board of Education of The Granite School District, A Body Politic of The State of Utah v. Salt Lake County, A Body Corporate And Politic And Arthur Monson, Salt Lake County Treasurer : Brief of Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
The Board of Education of The Granite School
District, A Body Politic of The State of Utah v. Salt
Lake County, A Body Corporate And Politic And
Arthur Monson, Salt Lake County Treasurer : Brief
of Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Ted Cannon and Bill Thomas Peters; Attorneys for Defendants,
and Respondents, and Cross AppellantsM. Byron Fisher and Charles B. Casper; Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellants
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, BOE Granite School District v. Salt Lake County, No. 17175 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2396
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
a body politic of the State 
of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic, and 
ARTHUR MONSON, Salt Lake 
County Treasurer, 
Case No • 17175 
. 
Defendants/Respondents/: 
and Cross-Appellants, : 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL AND JUDGMENT 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TJ!E 
STATE OF UTAH 
M. Byron Fisher 
Charles B. Casper 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Appellant 
BOO Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
:~t "::"county Attorney ~;:~!~~ 
and ~ . ·, .... ,,,,( 
Bill Thomas Peters · ·,.:.i.t}.i. t~ .. "' ··f l~~J', .... ,_,., 
Special Deputy County Attoc'BJ" ·, / . 
Attorneys for Defendants, .,, .·~~ 
Respondents, Cross-Appellan"111 . .t ; ,, 
400 Chancellor Building i'' ·· ··· 
220 South 200 East .·· 
Salt Lake City, Utah Hlll .> 
Telephone: (801) 531-7511 .·i0';1t.,. 
~ -~~''·-: '; 
F I L F: 
MAR 301981 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
a body politic of the State 
of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic, and 
ARTHUR MONSON, Salt Lake 
County Treasurer, 
Case No. 17175 
. 
Defendants/Respondents/: 
and Cross-Appellants, : 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL AND JUDGMENT 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
M. Byron Fisher 
Charles B. Casper 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Appellant 
BOO Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Ted Cannon 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
and 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Respondents, Cross-Appellants 
400 Chancellor Building 
220 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7575 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GRANITE'S ALIAS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
RENDERED ALL PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS, INCLUD-
ING THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, NULL AND 
VOID 
POINT II 
GRANITE'S CLAIMS AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND THE COUNTY TREASURER WERE BARRED BY 
THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
POINT III 
GRANITE HAS NO REMEDY AGAINST SALT LAKE 
COUNTY EVEN IF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT IS NOT APPLICABLE 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTORY DUTIES OF SECTION 53-7-10, 
U.C.A. (1953) AND 59-10-66, U.C.A. (1953), 
ARE DIRECTORY AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE BY 
THE TREASURER IS SUFFICIENT 
POINT V 
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES AND THE UTAH MONEY 
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1974 DENY GRANITE A 
REMEDY AGAINST THE COUNTY TREASURER FOR 
DAMAGES AND LIMIT GRANITE'S REMEDY TO A 
FORFEITURE OF THE TREASURER'S SALARY 
(i) 
Page No. 
1 
2 
3 
3 
10 
14 
18 
22 
23 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT VI 
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT A TRUSTEE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S TAX MONIES, NOR IS THE COUNTY 
TREASURER THE AGENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY IN 
THE COLLECTION OF SAID FUNDS, NOR IS SALT 
LAKE COUNTY LIABLE FOR OFFICIAL FACTS OF 
THE COUNTY TREASURER IN DISBURSING THOSE 
FUNDS 
POINT VII 
GRANITE IS BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES 
BY REASON THAT THEY ARE SPECULATIVE OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL 
POINT VIII 
GRANITE IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
AS TO A PORTION OF THE RECOVERY IT SEEKS 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ITS REMEDY LIES IN 
DAMAGES OR EQUITY. 
GRANITE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WAS NOT 
DAMAGED AS IT ALLEGES 
POINT IX 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WOULD BE 
TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE AND UNENFORCEABLE 
POINT X 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING COUNTIES 
EQUITABLE COUNTERCLAIM WHEN THE FACTS 
RELATING TO THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT OF 
GRANITE WERE UNCONTROVERTED 
CONCLUSION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
(ii) 
Page No. 
27 
38 
39 
43 
46 
48 
49 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Granite School District, 17 U.2d 
405, 413 P.2d 597 (1966) 
Board of Education of Nebo School District v. 
Jeppson, 74 U.576, 280 P 1065 (1929) 
Bowman v. Hayward, 1 U.2d 131, 262 P.2d 957 (1953) 
Page No. 
23 
24 
Captain v. Los Angeles Wrecking Co., 215 P.2d 12 
532 (1950) 
carbon canal Co. v. Sanpete Water User's 46 
Association, 452 P.2d 405 
carbon County v. Carbon County High School 
District, 143 P.220 (1914) 31 
Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners, 499 P.2d 270 (1972) 44 
crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 
(Utah 1976) 16 
Dixon v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, 313 Fed.Supp. 653 (1970) 45 
Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975) 19 
Glenn v. Player, 326 P.2d 717 (1958) 47 
Godbolt v. Clinton Sheet Greater Bethlehem Temple, 
167 N.W.2d 97 38,45 
Holt v. Utah State Road Commissioner, 30 U.2d 4, 
511 P.2d 1286 (1972) 38 
Jefferson county v. Ross, 196 Ky.366, 244 S.W. 793 24 
Johnson v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary 
District, 20 U.2d 389, 438 P.2d 706 19 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 
P.2d 705 (Utah 1978) 22,23 
Libberman v. Libberman, 130 N.Y.2d 163 45 
(iii) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Logan City v. Allen, 44 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1935) 
Mears v. Little Rock School District, 593 S.W. 2d 42 
(Ark. 1980) 
Pomona City School District v. Payne, SO P.2d 822 
(Cal. 1955) 
Roosendall Construction & Mining Corporation v. 
Holman, 28 U.2d 396 (1972) 
Sane v. Montana Power, 20 Fed.Supp. 843 
Sheay v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 
122 P.2d 60 (1942) 
Sinclair Refining Co. v. State Tax Commission, 139 
P.2d 663 (1942) 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of Commissioners, 
268, P.783, T85 
State v. Dixon, 22 U.2d 58, 448 P.2d 716 (1968) 
State Health Department v. Imperial County, 153 P.2d 
957 (Cal. App. 1944) 
State v. Tanner, 30 U.2d 19, 512 P.2d 1022 (1973) 
State of Missouri ex rel. Fort Zumwalt v. Dickleslen, 
576 So.2d 532 (Mo. 1979) 
Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local 
Union 222 v. Motor Cargo, 530 P.2d 807 (Utah 1974) 
Varoz v. Sevey, 29 U.2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (Utah 1973) 
Veteran's Welfare Board v. City of Oakland, 
169 P2d 1000, 1007 (Cal. App. 1946) 
(iv) 
Page No, 
23 
24 
37 
12 
46 
31 
44 
16 
45 
19 
38, 45 
34 
11 
16, 19 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Page 
17-5-19 31 
17-15-10 19 
17-18-2 21 
17-19-1 20 
51-4-2 25, 26, 27 
51-7-1 26, 33 
51-7-11 25 
51-7-15 26 
51-7-17 25, 33 
52-1-7 36 
52-1-8 36 
52-1-11 36 
53-7-10 22, 25, 28 
53-7-18 42 
59-5-46 28 
59-9-2 40 
59-9-2.1 41 
59-10-66 22, 25, 28 
59-10-69 26 
59-11-14 43 
(v) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 
63-30-13 
63-30-15 
78-12-30 
78-12-33 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Section 11, Article XIII 
Section 7, Article X 
(vi) 
16, 19 
18 
21 
18 
28 
34 
.. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an equitable action by plaintiff-appellant, 
Granite School District, a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah (herein referred to as Granite), against 
defendants/respondents/cross-appellants, Salt Lake County, 
also a political subdivision of the State of Utah (herein 
referred to as County), and Arthur L. Monson, who has held 
the statutory office of Salt Lake County Treasurer since 
January, 1975 (herein referred to as Treasurer). Granite 
asserts that the Treasurer did not turn over Granite's 
share of real property tax monies collected for the years 
1973-1974 (First Cause of Action), 1974-1975 (Second Cause 
of Action), 1975-1976 (Third Cause of Action) and 1976-1977 
(Fourth Cause of Action) in a timely manner as the Statutes 
require. 
The action also involves a Counterclaim filed by 
County to recover against Granite those monies actually 
expended by County in behalf of Granite to assess, collect, 
apportion and distribute tax monies to Granite in excess of 
the amount actually paid by Granite for such services during 
the same period of time. Said Counterclaim also sought 
recovery of the amount of unjust enrichment realized by 
Granite at the expense of the other taxing districts because 
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of early turn-over of funds to Granite. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Granite filed an Alias Second Amended Complaint 
against county and Treasurer seeking judgment on each cause 
of action for that income earned or which should have been 
earned by County and Treasurer from the Treasurer's 
investing of tax monies collected by his office. Granite 
also sought an injunction to compel the Treasurer to pay 
over all monies due within the time required by State law. 
County and Treasurer filed a Counterclaim seeking 
to recover those funds expended by County in excess of the 
sums paid by Granite to collect, apportion and distribute 
tax monies to Granite. Treasurer also asserted in said 
Counterclaim that because of early turn over of tax monies 
to Granite by Treasurer, that Granite became unjustly 
enriched at the expense of certain other taxing districts 
located within Salt Lake County to the extent Granite 
realized investment income on said funds. 
The Trial Court ruled that Salt Lake County was not 
unjustly enriched by the actions of the Treasurer at the 
expense of Granite School District. It further ruled that 
Granite was not unjustly enriched at the expense of Salt 
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Lake County even though the cost of collecting, apportioning 
and distributing tax monies to Granite exceeded the amount 
paid for said services by Granite. The Court also deter-
mined that the Treasurer, Monson, had performed his duties 
in accordance with the Statutes governing his office and in 
the manner set forth by the State Tax Commission of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake County Treasurer 
seek affirmance of the decision of the Trial Court insofar 
as it determined that the County had not been unjustly 
enriched through the actions of the Treasurer at the expense 
of Granite and that the Treasurer has performed his duties 
in accordance with the Statutes governing his office and as 
set forth by the State Tax Commission of Utah. 
The County seeks reversal of that portion of the 
Trial Court's decision which denies recovery to the County 
even though the cost of collecting, apportioning, and 
distributing tax monies to Granite School District exceeds 
the amount paid for such services by Granite. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
County and Treasurer object to the purported 
Statement of Facts as set forth in Granite's Brief. The 
-3-
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purported "Summary of Facts" is nothing more than a state-
ment of Granite's misconceived perception of the case, its 
position and the relief Granite seeks. It is not a state-
ment of the actual facts, summary or otherwise. The 
"Statement of Facts in Detail" submitted by Granite 
contains, for the most part, conclusions, argument, theory, 
suppositions, assumptions, and proposed solutions, but very 
few facts. 
Granite and County are 2 of 48 public taxing enti-
ties located within Salt Lake County for which the Treasurer 
collects and distributes funds (T-429). The 48 separate 
taxing entities contain 130 separate taxing districts each 
of which has its own separate mill levy. Within these 
districts and entities are over 200,000 separate assessable 
properties upon which a tax must be levied, collected and 
distributed (T-430). 
During the year the Treasurer receives checks and 
monies from many sources, including monies from Salt Lake 
County taxpayers within the taxing jurisdiction of each of 
the 48 entities and 130 districts. During the latter part 
of November of each year, up to and including the 30th day 
of November, said Treasurer receives checks and monies for 
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real property taxes which are deposited by him (T-430). 
Because of the large number of taxpayers, entities 
and districts involved, the funds were first deposited for 
collection and then separated at a later time when proper 
identification of funds could be made. There was no capabi-
lity during the years in question to separate, segregate and 
separately identify funds received when and as paid (T-430). 
The Treasurer receives monies from several sources including 
sales taxes, personal property taxes, real property taxes, 
licenses, revenue sharing and bail forfeitures. As soon as 
he receives the money, he deposits it. He does not identify 
it as property tax money or sales tax money or any kind of 
money at the time of the deposit (T-56). Until he is 
charged through final settlement by the Salt Lake County 
Auditor, he is unable to ascertain with certainty the exact 
amount of funds collected for each entity or district (T-67). 
He does not know, at the time of collection, how much money 
is due and owing to each entity or district. To the best of 
his ability he estimates in order to advance monies to the 
districts, but he does not know, and will not know until 
charged, how much he collected for each district (T-66). He 
instructs his employees " ••• to compute to the extent they 
can the amount that the district has coming ••• " (T-66). The 
-5-
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Treasurer's employees improve on the estimation each year. 
"The challenge is to come as close as they can to meet final 
settlement. We compute and meet final settlement on March 
31st without being charged, and when we are finally charged, 
to see how close we come. And so, the formula is being 
refined every year." (T-67-68). No evidence was presented 
at trial to establish that the Treasurer, at the time of 
collection, was capable of separate segregation or iden-
tification of the monies to specific taxing entities as the 
same were received (T-431). 
The evidence is further uncontroverted that 
numerous large institutional taxpayers draw tax payment 
checks on out of State banks, thereby extending the time 
within which said funds are finally cleared and in the hands 
of the Salt Lake County Treasurer. Even though checks have 
been received or postmarked as of the 30th of November of 
each year, said checks may not have cleared the bank and 
become good funds in the hands of the Treasurer until some-
time after said checks were deposited by the Treasurer 
(T-431). Even though such funds are deposited illllnediately, 
segregation and identification of payment to property and 
therefore district, takes place at a later date (T-66). In 
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that regard, the Treasurer acts as a fiduciary for all of 
the public entities located within Salt Lake County, 
including Granite School District and Salt Lake County 
(T-432). 
Prior to the date of final settlement, there are 
numerous activities that take place with regard to the 
assessment roll and the tax collection process that affect 
the amount of taxes collected and, therefore, renders it 
impractical for the Treasurer to know on any given date, 
exactly how much money he has on hand for each of the public 
taxing entities. These activities occur in each of the 48 
separate taxing entities in Salt Lake County. Included in 
such activities that affect the amount ultimately collected 
are actions by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in 
raising and lowering assessments; the collection process 
related to attached and unattached personal property; 
actions of the State Tax Commission of Utah acting on 
appeals; indigent abatements, veterans abatements, and blind 
abatements; refund actions for taxes illegally or erro-
neously paid or collected and Treasurer's relief, unpaid 
taxes and tax sales are all activities that affect the 
assessment roll, the collection process and the amounts 
collected, which render it impractical for the Treasurer, on 
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any given date prior to final settlement, to ascertain 
exactly how much money he should have on hand and how much 
of said money belongs to each of the various 48 public 
taxing entities located within Salt Lake County (T-432-433), 
Plaintiff's original Complaint contained two causes 
of action. The First Cause of Action sought damages by way 
of recovery of monies Granite would have earned had it 
received earlier turn over of funds and also sought compen-
sation for the cost of tax anticipation borrowing for the 
year 1973-1974. The Second Cause of Action was identical, 
except it involved the years 1974-1975 (T-2-6). 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed May 11, 1976, 
was substantially the same as the original Complaint, but 
included the tax year 1975-1976 and an additional damage 
claim for 1975 (T-14-19). 
On February 3, 1977, Granite filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court granted Granite's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the liability issue, but reserved the 
issue of damages (T-124-125). 
After several hearings before the Court, Granite 
filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended complaint. 
The reason stated for the Motion was to include tax collec-
-8-
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tions for the 1976 tax year (T-334). In a hearing before 
the Trial Court on September 19, 1978, it was agreed by the 
parties that the action was an action in equity rather than 
in law. Plaintiff, Granite, was granted leave to amend its 
Complaint to plead its case in equity (T-455-462). 
On the 16th day of October, 1978, another hearing 
was held before the Trial Judge for purposes of stipulating 
to the issues to be tried. The Second Amended Complaint was 
withdrawn and plaintiff was granted leave to file a new 
Second Amended Complaint and defendant was granted ten days 
to respond with the plaintiff filing a reply ten days after 
the defendants' Answer and Counterclaim (T-336). 
Granite's Alias Second Amended Complaint was filed 
on the 27th day of November, 1978. It was complete in and 
of itself. That Complaint was an entirely new lawsuit from 
the ones previously filed. It was an action in equity 
(T-237-243). Plaintiffs had never filed a Notice of Claim 
with Salt Lake County on any of the years in question 
(T-297-299), therefore, they had to change the entire theory 
of their case in order to try to avoid the legal affect of 
the failure to file such a claim. Defendants filed an 
Answer and Counterclaim to Granite's Alias Second Amended 
Complaint. County's Counterclaim also proceeded on an 
-9-
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equitable theory. The Treasurer, in his efforts to accomo-
date Granite during the years in question, had made advance-
ments of tax monies in excess of the amounts that were 
actually collected for Granite at that point in time. 
The Trial Court determined that there was no evi-
dence presented by Granite at Trial to show the exact dollar 
amount on deposit for Granite School Distrct on any given 
day during the period of time covered in Granite's Alias 
Second Amended Complaint. The Trial Court also found the 
evidence to be uncontroverted that Salt Lake County, during 
the years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977, expended 
$1,133,415.00 more to collect, apportion and distribute tax 
monies to Granite than was paid for by Granite (T-434). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GRANITE'S ALIAS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
RENDERED ALL PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS, 
INCLUDING THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
NULL AND VOID. 
Judge Winder, pursuant to Motion and argument, 
granted Granite a Partial Summary Judgment on its Amended 
Complaint. Nearly sixteen months later, after several Court 
hearings, Granite, after receiving leave of Court, filed an 
-10-
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Alias Second Amended Complaint. The Alias Second Amended 
Complaint was directed towards shifting the theory of 
plaintiff's case from one at law to one in equity. The 
theory of the case under Judge Winder was in the nature of 
damages allegedly suffered by Granite because of claimed 
late turn-over of funds. The theory of the Alias Second 
Amended Complaint filed before Judge Banks was in equity 
seeking recovery of any benefit realized by Salt Lake 
County. The later amendment was complete in and of itself. 
In Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 
Helpers, Local Union 222 v. Motor Cargo, 530 P2d 807 (Utah 
1974), this Court stated: 
"The law is overwhelming to the effect that when an 
amended complaint, complete in and of itself, is 
filed, the former complaint is functus officio and 
cannot be used for any purpose." (Emphasis supplied) 
In Sheay v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 122 
P2d 60 (1942), the plaintiff had obtained a judgment by 
default. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint. The 
Court, in allowing the amendment referred to the general 
rule that when a complaint is amended in substance, it 
operates to open a default. Not only did the filing of the 
Amended Complaint vacate the default, it superceded the ori-
ginal Complaint, which dropped out of the case and ceased 
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to' have any affect as a pleading or as a basis for a 
judgment. In Captain v. Los Angeles Wrecking Co., 215 P2d 
532 (1950), the Court concluded: 
"Furthermore, the Court was without power to permit 
the filing of a second amended complaint without 
first vacating the judgment which had been entered 
on June 29th." 
In the instant case, Granite filed two Amended 
Complaints after they had been granted Partial Summary 
Judgment. The previously granted Partial Summary Judgment 
became a nullity and was of no force or effect. Granite was 
required to prove its entire case on its "Alias Second 
Amended Complaint" and could not, therefore, rely upon the 
prior Partial Summary Judgment for any purpose. 
However, even if the prior Partial Summary Judgment 
were valid and enforceable, Granite failed to prove any 
unjust enrichment of County at its expense. With respect to 
Granite's First Cause of Action, there was no evidence in 
the record to show that the then Treasurer, who was not a 
party to the action, invested any collected funds at 
interest. Treasurer Monson did not take office until 1975, 
and since there was no evidence that any party other than 
the Treasurer was an active party, County could hardly be 
held responsible for any act committed by someone not be~ore 
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the Court, and, likewise, Treasurer Monson could not be held 
responsible for matters taking place prior to the time he 
assumed office. 
Granite's own Exhibits P-2, P-3, and P-4, further 
supported the Trial Court's finding that there was no unjust 
enrichment of the County. Exhibits P-2 and P-3 show the 
actual collection times for the years in question. They 
further showed that even though collections may have been 
credited on the 29th or 30th of November, the funds were in 
fact collected much later--in December. A comparison of 
those Exhibits to P-4, also introduced by Granite, 
established that monies were being turned over to Granite as 
they were being collected. Plaintiff, Granite's own 
Exhibits, clearly showed that the Treasurer had in fact per-
formed better than his predecessor in office. Exhibit P-10, 
introduced by Granite, further established that final 
settlement for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977, was made by 
the Statutory deadline of March 31st. 
Granite's own witness, William Sampson, testified 
that he could not say how much of Granite's money, if any, 
was on deposit on any given date. His approach was to take 
the total received at the end of the year or by settlement 
date, and then deduce backwards. This approach was purely 
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hypothetical and was not supported by any facts except for 
the year end total. He did not know whether the money on 
deposit belonged to Granite or the other 49 taxing entities. 
He did not know when the monies were, in fact, received. 
The evidence further indicated that there were 
times when Granite, through the Treasurer's policy of 
advancing funds, received as much as 92% of the total monies 
collected for all taxing districts, even though Granite's 
share was less than 20% of the total (T-152-168). For these 
reasons, the Trial Court correctly concluded that Salt Lake 
County had not been enriched at the expense of Granite 
School District. Therefore, even if the Partial Summary 
Judgment were enforceable, Granite failed to prove that it 
was injured by the Treasurer's actions or that the County 
received a benefit at the expense of Granite. 
POINT II 
GRANITE'S CLAIMS AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND THE COUNTY TREASURER WERE BARRED BY 
THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
Immunity on an action for damages arising out of 
governmental activities is absolute unless waived by 
Statute1 likewise, strict procedural compliance with pre-
sentation of claim Statutes is prerequisite of bringing 
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suit and, finally, a suit must be brought within the time 
prescribed by Statutes of Limitation. Judicial interpreta-
tion concerning each of these requirements is replete in 
Utah law with the exception of a direct holding as to 
whether immunity itself is waived as between political 
subdivisions. 
As to procedural matters, including presentation of 
claims, the Statutes of Limitation, Statutory law binds 
public as well as private parties. The evidence is 
uncontroverted that Granite did not file a Notice of Claim 
with Salt Lake County for any of the years in question. 
As to legal status of immunity itself, one could 
take the obvious approach by stating that immunity as bet-
ween political subdivisions is not waived because there is 
no Utah Statute providing such a waiver. Indeed, this would 
comport with the universal rule. Perhaps the reason for a 
dearth of direct authority on the matter is that it has been 
thought settled. However, California has held that all 
Statutes concerning immunity, presentation of claims and 
limitations on actions are applicable as between political 
subdivisions, and Respondents submit this is a reasonable 
interpretation. Any other interpretation creates great dif-
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ficulty in delineating when Statutes of Limitations begin to 
run. State Health Department v. Imperial County, 153 P2d 
957 (Cal. App. 1944); Veteran's Welfare Board v. City of 
Oakland, 169 P2d 1000, 1007 (Cal. App. 1946). 
In the Trial Court, the County has extensively 
argued that Granite has no remedy against it for injuries 
that may have occurred pursuant to the County's governmental 
taxing activities or pursuant to discretionary acts of the 
County Treasurer. However, if for purposes of argument, one 
assumes immunity under the Statute has been waived, then 
Granite is nevertheless barred because it did not file a 
Notice of Claim. See Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P2d 
646 (Utah 1976) and extensive citations therein. Section 
63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953, state unequivocally: 
"A claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed 
within ninety days after the cause of action 
arises ••• " (emphasis added) 
In Varoz v. Sevey, 29 U.2d 158, 506 P2d 435 (Utah 
1973), in upholding the dismissal of a wrongful death action 
by a minor when the notice of claim was filed after ninety 
days had elapsed, the Court said: 
"From the language of the Statute it is quite clear 
that the Legislature intended to make the filing of 
a timely notice of claim prerequisite to main-
taining an action." 
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In Roosendall Construction & Mining Corporation v. 
Holman, 28 U.2d 396 (1972), the Court, in construing the 
filing of a claim requirement as it relates to the State and 
affirming dismissal for failure to file, stated: 
"As to the plaintiff's claim for damages it must 
proceed, if at all, pursuant to the provisions of 
Title 63, Chapter 30, u.c.A., 1953, known as the 
Governmental Immunity Act. A prerequisite in 
pursuing a claim against the State or its officers 
is compliance with ••• (filing of claim within one 
year) ••• It appears the plaintiff's complaint is 
fatally defective in that it does not allege ~ 
compliance with that section." (emphasis added) 
Even assuming plaintiff's complaint would be con-
sidered notice of claim, for which there is no authority, 
the suit is barred because it was not initiated within 
.ninety days after the cause of action (arose) •• n 
Granite commenced its action on November 25, 1975, 
which was at least six months after its Second Cause of 
Action arose and at least eighteen months after its First 
Cause of Action arose. Had Granite first filed a claim at 
the time it commenced this suit, it would have been barred 
by not filing a timely claim. How then can Granite maintain 
a suit when it cannot meet the requirements for even filing 
a claim, a prerequisite to suit? 
Furthermore, allowing suit without first requiring 
the filing of a claim has the effect of permitting a plain-
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tiff to extend the Statute of Limitations. The limitation 
period on actions brought under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is at best one year and three months. Section 
63-30-15, u.c.A., 1953, reads: 
"If a claim is denied, a claimant may institute an 
action in the district court against the govern-
mental entity in those circumstances where immunity 
from suit has been waived as in this Act provided. 
Said action must be commenced within one year after 
denial or the denial period as specified herein." 
In Utah, the State and its political subdivisions 
are subject to Statutes of Limitations. See Section 
78-12-33, U.C.A., 1953, and annotations thereunder. 
Sequentially then, under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, three conditions must be met if plaintiff is 
to have a remedy: (1) the cause of action must be a 
Statutory exception to immunity; (2) a timely notice must 
be filed; and (3) suit must be brought within the time 
prescribed. Granite's suit failed to meet any of the afore-
said conditions. 
POINT III 
GRANITE HAS NO REMEDY AGAINST SALT LAKE 
COUNTY EVEN IF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
Common law sovereign immunity bars recovery against 
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--
Salt Lake County on cause of action for damages arising out 
of governmental activity. Johnson v. Salt Lake county 
cottonwood Sanitary District, 20 U.2d 389, 438 P2d 706 
(1968). Granite has not contested that tax matters are 
governmental. However, assuming common law immunity is 
waived, a plaintiff must nevertheless file a claim before 
filing suit. State v. Dixon, 22 u.2d 58, 448 P2d 716 
(1968); Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P2d 476 (Utah 1975). In 
Edwards, the Court stated: 
0 No notice of claim was filed by plaintiff with 
the County. The plaintiff filed her complaint on 
June 7, 1973, and a summons was served on September 
6, 1973. The first notification of plaintiff's 
claim came when these proceedings were initiated. 
The Trial Court dismissed the Complaint on the 
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to file a 
notice of a claim as provided for in Section 
63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953, which states that a claim 
against a political subdivision shall be forever 
barred unless notice thereof is filed within 90 
days after the cause of action arises. The fact 
that employees of the county knew of plaintiff's 
injuries at the time they occurred does not 
dispense with the necessity of filing a timely 
claim. (Varoz v. Sevey, 29 U.2d 158, 506 P2d 435) 
The plaintiff's claim would also be barred by the 
provisions of Section 17-15-10, u.c.A., 1953. 
The filing of a complaint with the clerk of 
the district court, even though done one day before 
the year had elapsed would not comply with the re-
quirements of filing a claim as required by Section 
17-15-10, u.c.A., 1953 ••• " 
Section 17-15-10, u.c.A., 1953, reads: 
"The board of county commissioners shall not 
hear or consider any claim of any person against 
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the county, nor shall the board credit or allow any 
claim or bill against the county, unless the same 
is itemized, giving names, dates and particular 
service renderd, or until it has been passed upon 
by the county auditor. If the claim is for service 
of process, it shall state the cha7acter of process 
served, upon whom, the number of miles traveled; if 
for materials furnished, to whom, by whom ordered, 
quantity and price agreed upon. Every claim 
against the county must be presented to the counti 
auditor within a year after the last item of the 
account or claim accrued. In all cases claims 
shall be duly substantiated as to their correctness 
and as to the fact that they are justly due. If 
the board shall refuse to hear or consider a claim 
because it is not properly made out, it shall cause 
notice of the fact to be given to the claimant or 
to his agent, • • • " (emphasis added) 
Upon receiving the claim, the County Auditor has 
certain Statutory duties to perform. Section 17-19-1 reads: 
•All persons holding claims against a county 
must present the same to the county auditor, and he 
shall investigate and examine into all such claims, 
and report the same, together with his findings, to 
the board of county commissioners at the next 
regular session after such investigation shall 
have been completed, with his approval or 
disapproval, endorsed thereon; and he shall keep, 
in a book kept for that purpose, a complete record 
of all such claims and of his action thereon and 
the reasons for the same, and the action of the 
board thereon. All bills, claims, accounts or 
charges for materials of any kind or nature that 
may be purchased by or on behalf of the county by 
any of the county officers or contracted for by the 
board of county commissioners shall be 
investigated, examined and inspected by the county 
a~ditor, and he shall endorse his approval or 
disapproval thereon before any warrant for the 
payment of the same can be drawn." 
Finally, it is the duty of the County Attorney to 
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• .oppose all claims and accounts against the county when 
he deems then unjust or illegal." Section 17-18-2, u.c.A., 
1953. 
With respect to such claims applicable Statute of 
Limitations, similar to that governing the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act apply to suits brought against the County. 
Section 78-12-30, U.C.A., 1953, reads: 
"Actions on claims against a county, city, or 
incorporated town, which have been rejected by the 
board of county commissioners, city commissioners, 
city council or board of trustees, as the case may 
be, must be commenced within one year after the 
first rejection thereof by such board of county or 
city commissioners, city council or board of 
trustees." 
County and Treasurer urge upon this Court that 
Granite's remedy against it must fail for want of waiver of 
sovereign immunity, failure to file a timely claim and by 
reason of the Statute of Limitations. 
Allowing the suit to proceed without the prere-
quisite review and determination by County officials 
constitutes a judicial intrusion into government. The 
jurisdiction of the Court in the instant matter attaches 
only after the County has acted or failed to act on a claim 
properly filed. The Trial Court, by entertaining this suit, 
prematurely precluded the County's elected officers from 
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exercising duties accorded them by law. 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTORY DUTIES OF SECTION 53-7-10, 
u.c.A. (1953) AND 59-10-66, u.c.A. (1953), 
ARE DIRECTORY AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE BY 
THE TREASURER IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE. 
In Point II of its Brief, Granite argues for strict 
compliance with the Statutory deadlines involved in this 
case and then attempts to distinguish four earlier Utah 
cases dealing with the subject. However, Granite completely 
ignores this Court's more recent case of Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P2d 705 (Utah 1978), which 
held similar Statutory deadlines to be directory rather than 
mandatory and therefore, substantial compliance to be 
sufficient. The guidelines set down by this Court in 
Kennecott are equally applicable to the instant case. "The 
most fundamental one is that the Court should give effect to 
the intention of the Legislature." In the instant case, the 
legislative intent was to set the time frame within which 
to collect, turn over, and finally account for property tax 
revenues. That intent has not been frustrated by the 
Treasurer's actions herein. In fact, the Trial Court speci-
fically concluded that he had performed his duties in accor-
dance with the Statutes governing his office (T-435). There 
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is no indication in the Statutes governing the Treasurer's 
office that would indicate that the Legislature intended 
that an untimely performance on the part of the Treasurer 
would render his actions illegal. There is no indication 
that the Legislature intended that the County become liable 
for an untimely performance by the Treasurer, if, in fact, 
his performance was untimely. It is respectfully submitted 
that under the facts of this case and this Court's ruling in 
Kennecott, supra the Treasurer has fully complied with his 
Statutory duties and there is therefore no basis upon which 
to assert liability to Granite. 
POINT V 
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES AND THE UTAH MONEY 
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1974 DENY GRANITE A 
REMEDY AGAINST THE COUNTY TREASURER FOR 
DAMAGES AND LIMIT GRANITE'S REMEDY TO A 
FORFEITURE OF THE TREASURER'S SALARY. 
In applying common law principles of immunity from 
liability, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. 
Granite School District, 17 U.2d 405, 413 P2d 597 (1966) at 
599: 
"In common with other public officers, they 
(defendant school board members) have authority to 
do whatever is reasonably necessary in carrying out 
duties imposed upon them. It would be impractical 
and unfair to require them to act at their own 
risk. This would not only be disruptive of the 
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proper functioning of public institutions, but 
undoubtedly would dissuade competent and responsible 
persons from accepting.the re~po~sibilities of 
public office. Accordingly, it is the settled 
policy of the law that when a public official acts 
in good faith, believing what he does to be within 
the scope of his authority and in line with his 
duty, he is not liable for damages even if he makes 
a mistake in the exercise of his judgment." 
Immunity from liability for a mistake in judgment 
n .extends to errors in the determination of both of law, 
and of fact." Logan City v. Allen, 44 P2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 
1935). 
In Board of Education of Nebo School District v. 
Jeppson, 74 u. 576, 280 P. 1065 (1929) the School Board sued 
the County Treasurer and his surety for a decrease in its 
tax monies occasioned by an irregular or void abatement. In 
denying liability, the Court said at 74 u. 587, 588: 
"• •• there are instances in which a public officer 
who in good faith and in a perplexing situation, 
makes an erroneous decision as to his duty and acts 
thereon and thereby violates the law will not be 
held liable ••• Such a case is Jefferson County v. 
Ross, 196 Ky. 366, 244 s.w. 793. In this case 
Ross, a tax collector, in good faith, and in a 
perplexing situation as to the rule of law 
governing the matter, paid over to the State audi-
tor certain taxes which should have been paid over 
to the school board. It was held that the tax 
collector was not liable to the school board for 
diverting the funds ••• • 
Granite contends that judgment and discretion are 
not required in disbursing tax monies even though at least 
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three different Statutes and the State Tax Manual are 
contradictory: Section 53-7-10, U.C.A., 1953, provides 
turn-over of funds " ••• within thirty days after it is 
collected,"; Section 59-10-66, U.C.A., 1953, provides 
• ••• on the first day of each month, all monies in his 
hands collected," and Section 51-4-2, U.C.A., 1953, provides 
• ••• on or before the tenth day of each month ••• funds 
received or collected ••• within the month last past," and 
the Tax Manual states: "• •• January 1 and monthly 
thereafter." 
Respondents urge that in choosing the Statute or 
Rule to follow, the Treasurere necessarily selects among 
alternatives. Whenever alternatives are present, judgment 
and discretion are operative, notwithstanding Granite's 
assertions to the contrary. 
In addition, whether or not the County Treasurer 
invests funds, including tax monies, is entirely 
discretionary, Section 51-7-11, u.c.A., 1953, as are the 
types of investments he makes so long as they are within 
Statutory guidelines. Sections 51-7-11 and 51-7-17, u.c.A., 
1953. 
Also, because there is no Statute on the subject, 
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Respondents contend that the Treasurer, confronted with the 
inability or impracticability of apportioning interest on 
tax monies among the 40 taxing districts, was acting both 
with discretion and in good faith when said interest was 
transferred to the County's general fund. 
The Utah Money Management Act of 1974, 51-7-1, et 
seq., u.c.A., 1953, further limits the liability of the 
County Treasurer in two ways. First, he and his bondsman 
are released from liability for any loss of public funds 
occasioned by investments made in conformity with the Act, 
unless the loss is the result of malfeasance. Section 
51-7-15, U.C.A., 1953. Consequently, any interest "lost" by 
Granite is governed by this provision and Granite did not 
allege or prove malfeasance. 
The second limitation is brought about by the 1974 
amendment to Section 51-4-2, u.c.A., 1953. 
The penalty imposed by Statute on a County 
Treasurer for failure to settle or make payments to the 
State is three months forfeiture of salary. 59-10-69, 
U.C.A., 1953: 
"Every county treasurer who neglects or refuses to 
make payment as herein required shall forfeit three 
months salary ••• " (emphasis added) 
The "as herein required" references Section 51-4-2, 
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u.c.A., 1953, which was amended by Utah State Money 
Management Act of 1974. Prior to the Act, Section 51-4-2 
only applied to monies the County Treasurer was required to 
pay the State. The amendment expanded the requirement to 
payments made by the County Treasurer to all political 
subdivisions. 
Respondents therefore submit that it was the inten-
tion of the Utah State Legislature to provide all political 
subdivision with the same recourse as the State--a fore-
feiture of salary for the failure of the County Treasurer to 
remit tax payments in a timely manner. 
POINT VI 
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT A TRUSTEE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S TAX MONIES, NOR IS THE COUNTY 
TREASURER THE AGENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY IN 
THE COLLECTION OF SAID FUNDS, NOR IS SALT 
LAKE COUNTY LIABLE FOR OFFICIAL ACTS OF 
THE COUNTY TREASURER IN DISBURSING THOSE 
FUNDS. 
Granite consistently muddles the role of Salt Lake 
County, acting through its Board of Commissioners and the 
role of the County Treasurer with respect to tax matters. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law sup-
porting the Partial summary Judgment now relied upon by 
Granite in its appeal, do not even mention the defendant 
Salt Lake County. Likewise, all of the Statutes quoted by 
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Granite in its attempt to demonstrate liability refer solely 
to the duties imposed on County Treasurers by the State 
Legislature. Unfortunately, both factually and legally, 
Granite persists in concluding that Salt Lake County has 
breached a duty to Granite although said County had nothing 
to do with the matters complained of by Granite. 
Both Statutes cited by Granite concerning the dis-
bursements of school district tax money, Section 53-7-10 and 
Section 59-10-66, U.C.A., 1953, relate to the Treasurer's 
duty to collect and disburse tax money. The Board of 
Commissioners' Statutory role is only to establish the tax 
levy. Furthermore, the Board of Commissioners does not 
supervise the activities of a Treasurer in performing his 
official tax duties. Section 11, Artice XIII, of the 
Constitution of Utah, grants that prerogative to the Utah 
State Tax Commission: 
"The State Tax Commission shall administer and-
supervise the tax laws of the State." 
Pursuant to the aforesaid Constitutional mandate, the Utah 
State Legislature has delegated the following powers and 
duties to the Tax Commission. Section 59-5-46, U.C.A., 
1953: 
"(3) To prescribe such rules and regulations as 
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it may deem necessary, not in conflict with the 
Constitution and laws of the State, to govern 
county boards and officers in the performance of 
any duty in connection with assessment, equaliza-
tion and collection of general taxes." 
"(9) To have and exercise general supervision 
over the administration of the tax laws of the 
State, over assessors and over county boards in the 
performance of their duties as county boards of 
equalization and over other county officers in the 
performance of their duties in connection with 
assessment of property and collection of taxes, to 
the end that all assessments of property be made 
just and equal, at true value, and that the tax 
burden may be distributed without favor or 
discrimination." 
"{11) To confer with, advise and direct county 
treasurers and assessors in matters relating to the 
assessment and equalization of property for taxa-
tion and the collection of taxes, and to provide 
for an hold annually at such time and place as may 
be convenient to district or State convention of 
county assessors to consider and discuss matters 
relative to taxation, uniformity of valuation, and 
changes in the law relative to taxation, and 
methods of assessment. Every county assessor 
called to attend such district or state convention 
shall attend at the time and place designated by 
the tax commission. The traveling expense of each 
county assessor called to attend such convention 
shall be a charge against the county and paid in 
the same manner as other claims against the 
county." 
"{12) To confer with, advise and direct other 
county officers charged by law with duties relating 
to the assessment and equalization of property for 
taxation and the collection of taxes, and to pro-
vide for and hold at such times and places as may 
be deemed necessary district or state conventions 
of such officers for the consideration and 
discussion of matters relative to taxation, unifor-
mity of valuation, and changes in the laws relative 
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"Suppose any one of the school district officers 
should embezzle funds or destroy or appropriate to 
his own use any other property of the corporation, 
could the county, or the county commissioners in 
its name and behalf, institute and maintain an 
action to recover the same? We think no one will 
seriously so contend. A conclusive answer to such 
an action is that the county has nothing to do with 
either the funds or officers of the school cor-
poration or has nothing to do with either the funds 
or officers of the school corporation or has any in 
interest in their funds. 
For convenience the county treasurer is charged 
with the duty of collecting all moneys derived from 
tax action in his county, including school taxes. 
After collecting them, he must account for them. 
The Legislature could have required him to account 
to the officers of the high school district, or to 
the state superintendent of schools, or to the 
county commissioners and to the state 
superintendent, as was done ••• In our judgment, 
when the county treasurer has paid the money to 
the school district treasurers, as required by the 
statute, he has discharged the full duty imposed 
upon him by law respecting school funds." 
With respect to trust law, and cases construing the 
same, the Treasurer may indeed be a trustee of plaintiff's 
tax monies to the same extent as he may be a trustee with 
respect to 40 other taxing districts, including Salt Lake 
County. However, Salt Lake County is not the trustee, and 
if any breach of trust occurred, the breach was committed by 
the Treasurer, not the County. Further, the governing body 
of the County, its Board of Commissioners, was never 
informed by Granite that the Treasurer was not performing as 
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required by law. At most, Salt Lake County or its general 
fund is the unwitting recipient of interest alleged to have 
been earned by the Treasurer on Granite's tax money and, 
even as to such money, Granite admits " ••• because of the 
county's (sic) investment policies and the commingling of 
funds belonging to various governmental units, the actual 
interest earned is uncertain." (T-199) Further, as set 
forth in Point I of this Brief, Granite failed to introduce 
any evidence that would show that any interest was earned on 
funds belonging to Granite. 
Furthermore, the Board of Commissioners not only 
has no duty to invest money, whether its own or Granite's, 
it has no right to invest funds. That right lies with the 
Treasurer. State Money Management Act of 1974, Section 
51-7-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953. Even so, the Treasurer's 
right to invest is just that--a right~ he is not required by 
law to invest public money. Section 51-7-17, U.C.A., 1953. 
Granite's assertion to the contrary is without foundation. 
Granite's consistent references to laws concerning private 
fiduciaries are irrelevant. The duties of both the Board of 
Commissioners and the Treasurer are determined by Statute. 
With respect to its complaints pertaining to the 
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Treasurer on tax matters, Granite perhaps would be better 
advised to charge the State of Utah with a breach of duty 
rather than Salt Lake County, since the State Tax Commission 
has specific Statutory supervision over the Treasurer in tax 
matters, as noted earlier, and Section 7, Article X, of the 
Utah Constitution reads: 
•All public School Funds shall be guaranteed by the 
State against loss or diversion." 
Granite's references to Pomona City School District 
v. Payne, 50 P2d 822 (Cal. App. 1955) and other California 
cases as supportive of its trust and interest theories have 
little relevancy. Under the California Depository Act, the 
school district was required to keep its funds on deposit in 
the County Treasury and by law the County Treasurer was 
required by Act to pay interest on those funds. 
Similarly, the case of State of Missouri ex rel. 
Fort Zumwalt v. Dickleslen, 576 So2d 532 (Mo. 1979) is not 
applicable to the instant case because Missouri, like 
California, had a specific Statute that dealt with the sub-
ject of interest on school district funds. Utah has no such 
Statutory requirement. Mears v. Little Rock School 
District, 593 S.W.2d 42 (Ark. 1980), is also 
distinguishable. In that case, Pulaski County Quorum Court 
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passed an ordinance that had the effect of allowing the 
county to use all tax monies to earn interest. The Supreme 
court determined such an Ordinance to be illegal. In the 
instant case, there is no evidence to show that the County 
or the Treasurer deliberately held onto tax funds to 
generate interest. The evidence is that he used his best 
efforts to ascertain whose money it probably was and then 
made advancements. The Court in Mears further determined 
that the Ordinance was contrary to a specific provision of 
the Arkansas Constitution. No such challenge exists in the 
case at bar. 
In the instant case, Granite was never able to show 
how much, if any, of its monies were on deposit at any given 
time. The money was coming in from all taxing districts, 
advances were being made based upon previous years' 
performance. Finally, in Mears, the Court relied on a spe-
cific act by the Arkansas Legislature which specifically 
prohibited the County from passing: 
"(c) Any legislative act that applied to or affect 
the public school system except that a County 
government may impose an assessment where 
established by the General Assembly, reasonably 
related to the cost of any service or specific 
benefit provided by County government •• •" 
593 s.w. 2d 42 at page 44. No such provision or prohibition 
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has been asserted in the instant case. It is therefore sub-
mitted that the cases cited by Granite are not controlling 
in the instant action. 
Finally, even assuming the County Treasurer is 
liable to Granite for failure to perform his duties as 
required by law, Granite has no remedy against Salt Lake 
county. It is, and has been the law in Utah since 
Statehood, that the sole remedy for the deliction of a 
public official in performing duties imposed upon him by 
Statute is to proceed against said official and his surety. 
Section 52-1-7, u.c.A., 1953, reads: 
"The official bond of a public official shall be 
deemed a security to the state, county, city, town, 
school district or other municipal or public 
corporation, as the case may be, and also to all 
persons severally, for official delinquencies 
against which it is intended to provide." 
Section 52-1-8, U.C.A., 1953, states: 
"When a public officer by official misconduct or 
neglect of duty shall forfeit his bond or render 
his sureties liable thereon, any person injured by 
such misconduct or neglect, or who by law is 
entitled to the benefit of the security, may main-
tain an action thereon in his own name against the 
officer and his sureties to recover the amount to 
which he may by reason thereof be entitled." 
Section 52-1-11, u.c.A., 1953, states: 
"Whenever, except in criminal prosecutions, any 
special penalty, forfeiture or liability is imposed 
upon any officer for nonperformance or malperfor-
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mance of his official duties, the liability 
therefor attaches to the official bond of such 
officer." 
The legal test for the application of the foregoing 
provisions is stated in Bowman v. Hayward, 1 U.2d 131, 262 
P2d 957 (1953): 
"The test should be: would he (the public officer) 
have acted in the particular instance if he were 
not clothed with his official character, or would 
he have so acted if he were not an officer? If he 
assumed to act as an off icer--whether under valid 
or void process, or under no process whatever--the 
bondsman should be held, as he is held, for they 
are the sponsors of his integrity as an officer 
while acting as such." 
Most obvious in the case at bar is the fact that 
the collection and disbursement of tax money is an official 
act of an officer-the Treasurer. 
As the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated in 
applying the rule to the Sheriff in Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County v. Board of Commissioners, Supra: 
"Certain it is that the board of commissioners is 
not nor are any of its members in any sense civilly 
or otherwise liable for the official acts of a 
deputy sheriff but the sheriff is so civilly 
liable." 
The public policy underlying the aforesaid Statutes 
and Court ruling is to protect the public entity and its 
taxpayers from any liability that might result from the 
deliction of a public officer. The County and the public 
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are not insurers of the officer's conduct--that is the legal 
role of his sureties on his bond. 
POINT VII 
GRANITE IS BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES 
BY REASON THAT THEY ARE SPECULATIVE OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL. 
Granite's recovery is barred by sovereign immunity, 
whether common law or Statutory, because actions for damages 
are not permitted with respect to governmental functions 
unless there is an express Statutory waiver, and no waiver 
exists as to speculative or consequential damages. Holt v. 
Utah State Road Commission, 30 U.2d 4, 511 P2d 1286 (1973): 
State v. Tanner, 30 U.2d 19, 512 P2d 1022 (1973). 
Granite's contentions that damages should be 
measured by what Respondents could have made or should have 
made, or what Granite could have made or should, are at best 
consequential and most probably speculative. Therefore, 
recovery is barred as a matter of law. 
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POINT VIII 
GRANITE IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
AS TO A PORTION OF THE RECOVERY IT SEEKS 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ITS REMEDY LIES IN 
DAMAGES OR EQUITY. 
GRANITE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WAS NOT 
DAMAGED AS IT ALLEGES. 
Assuming for argument that Granite was not barred 
from recovery on any one or all of the grounds heretofore 
asserted by Respondents, and assuming Granite could have 
proved the amount of interest earned on its funds, if any, 
by County, Granite, nevertheless, is not the real party in 
interest as to most of the funds involved in this suit. 
The percentages next set forth represent those per-
centages of Granite's total real property tax receipts that 
are directly tied to the State's Uniform School Fund. 
1973-1974 (53%; 1974-1975 (61%); 1975-1976 (62%). (T-279) 
The percentages represent that proportion of 
Granite's total real property tax receipts on which the 
State of Utah, by law, pays a fixed sum of money. That is, 
regardless of the amount Granite receives on that propor-
tion of tax monies, the State guarantees and pays to the 
school district a fixed sum of money. Furthermore, on most 
of those funds, any tax raised in excess of the State's 
guarantee must be paid by teh County Treasurer into the 
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State Uniform School Fund. Consequently, as to the above-
referenced percentages of total receipts, Granite can have 
no damage--it received all of the money the law allows. 
The relevant provisions of the Tax Code on the 
minimum school program are set forth below. Section 59-9-2, 
u.c.A., 1953, states: 
"During the first week in August the state tax 
commission shall ascertain from the state board of 
education the number of distribution units in each 
school district in the state of Utah for the 
current school year, estimated according to the 
Minimum School Finance Act, and the moneys 
necessary for the cost of the operation and main-
tenance of the minimum school program of the state 
of Utah for the school fiscal year beginning July 
1st preceding. 
0 (1) The state tax commission shall then deter-
mine for each school district the amount that should 
be raised by the minimum basic tax levy that it is 
required to impose in conformity with the require-
ments of the Minimum School Finance Act as its 
contribution toward the cost of the basic state-
supported program. 
0 (2) Each county auditor shall be notified by 
the state tax commission of the fact that said 
minimum basic tax levy must be imposed by the 
school district and of the amount of such levy, to 
which shall be added such additional amount, if 
any, due to local undervaluation as hereinafter 
provided. The auditor shall inform the board of 
county commissioners as to the amount of such levy. 
The board of county commissioners shall at the time 
and in teh manner provided by law make such levy 
upon the taxable property in the school district 
together with such further levies for school pur-
poses as may be required by each school district to 
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pay the costs of programs in excess of the basic 
state-supported school program. 
"(3) In the event that the levy applied 
according to the above schedule will raise an 
amount in excess of the total basic state-supported 
school program for any one school district, such 
excess amount shall be remitted by the county, 
within which such district is located, to the state 
treasurer to be credited by him to the uniform 
school fund to be used for allocation to school 
districts as are other moneys therein to support 
the basic state-supported school program. The 
availability of said money shall be considered by 
the tax commission in fixing the state property tax 
levy as provided in the Minimum School Finance 
Act." (emphasis added) 
Section 59-9-2.l reads: 
"In providing for remittance to the state 
treasurer of any excess collections from the tax 
levy applied for the basic state-supported program 
as specified in paragraph (2) [(3)] of section 
59-9-2, Utah Code Annoted 1953, as amended by 
Chapter 35, Laws of Utah 1953, First Special 
Session said excessamount shall be remitted in the 
following manner: 
"(a) Monthly, as said levies are collected, 
ninety percent of the amount by which the money 
then collected, pursuant to said levy, exceeds the 
estimated total basic state-supported school 
program of the district upon the basic (basis) of 
which the levy was computed, shall be transferred. 
"(b) As soon after the end of the school year 
as the school district can determine the actual 
cost of its basic state-supported school program 
and inform the county auditor thereof, the county 
shall determine the actual! amount of said excess 
and remit the same to the state treasurer." 
A reciprocal provision in the Education Code, 
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Section 53-7-18, U.C.A., 1953, provides: 
"The state shall contribute to each district 
toward the cost of the basic state-supported school 
program in such district that portion which exceeds 
the proceeds of a minimum basic tax levy of 28 
mills imposed by the district. 
"In order to qualify for receipt of the state 
contribution toward the basic program and as its 
contribution twoard its costs of said basic 
program, each school district shall impose a mini-
mum basic tax levy of 28 mills. 
"In the school districts where the proceeds of 
the minimum basic tax levy equal or exceed the cost 
of the basic state-supported school program, there 
shall be no contribution by the state toward the 
basic program. The proceeds of any said minimum 
basic tax levy of a school district which exceed 
the cost of the basic program shall be paid into 
the uniform school fund as provided by law." 
The required minimum basic tax of 28 mills may be 
adjusted by the State Tax Commission to obtain parity sta-
tewide on property tax assessment levels. Illustratively, 
Granite was only required to levy 27.23 mills in 1974. 
However, regardless of the amount of money raised by this 
mill levy, Granite, by law was entitled to receive no more 
or no less than $508.00 per weighted pupil unit in 1973-74, 
and $560.00 for 1974-75, 75-76. (T-282) 
Thus, having received all the law permits, Granite 
has no damage. 
Likewise, in equity, if interest follows principal, 
interest that might be due is due the State, not Granite. 
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As the consequence of the state-supported programs 
above-referenced, Granite received all the money the law 
allows on those percentages of its total tax income alluded 
to earlier. Thus, Granite had no damages. Likewise, if it 
be asserted that interest income follows principal, said 
interest would be owing to the State and not to Granite. 
POINT IX 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WOULD BE TOTALLY 
INAPPROPRIATE AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
A review of the allegations of Granite's Alias 
Second Amended Complaint will quickly demonstrate that 
Granite did not plead a case for injunctive relief. Nor did 
the evidence at trial present a basis for injunctive relief. 
The Legislature has recognized that in the area of taxation, 
the remedy of injunction should be limited. Section 
59-11-14, u.c.A., 1953, as amended, specifically prohibits 
the remedy of injunction except where the Court determines 
the alternative remedy to be inadequate. As was stated by 
Justice Wolfe: 
"Taxation proceedings are on a time table. When 
an agency charged with a series of duties in rela-
tion to a taxation plan or program is stopped at 
the beginning or before the final step in the pro-
cess of the execution with which it is charged, 
much public harm may result." 
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"What would happen to the whole of our taxing 
machinery if at any stage of the functioning a tax-
payer could by injunction or Writ of Prohibition, 
hold up all succeeding steps ••• " 
Sinclair Refining Co. v. State Tax Commission, 139 P2d 663 
(1942). 
While the above language referred to the Statute 
relating to payment under protest, the reasoning is equally 
applicable to the instant action. The Courts should be very 
careful when dealing with the function of a governmental 
body such as is involved in this case. Such bodies must be 
given reasonable latitude of discretion to carry out their 
responsibilites in an efficient and appropriate manner. See 
Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners, 499 P2d 270 (1972). Not only is injunctive 
relief inappropriate in tax cases, it is also disruptive. 
If the Court were to undertake to fashion some type of 
injunctive relief against the Treasurer, it would involve 
itself into the entire tax structure, because the 
Treasurer's ability to perform his functions is dependent 
upon the Auditor. The Auditor depends upon the County 
Commission, which in turn depends upon the Assessor. The 
Assessor depends upon the Recorder. 
The jobs performed by each of the County officials 
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with regard to taxes in turn are influenced by the Tax 
commission. Each time the Treasurer was delayed by the 
actions of some other body of officer, he would have to 
involve the Court to avoid being in contempt of the Court's 
order. THe imposition of an injunction against the 
Treasurer would embroil the Court into an insurmountable 
task. It is a maxim of equity that the Court will not adju-
dicate an issue where the problems of fashioning a remedy 
are so difficult as to be insurmountable. Dixon v. Attorney 
General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 313 Fed. Supp. 
653 (1970). Similarly, equity will do nothing in vain. 
Godbolt v. Clinton Sheet Greater Bethlehem Temple, 167 
N.W.2d 97. See also Libberman v. Libberman, 130 N.Y.2d 163; 
Sane v. Montana Power, 20 Fed. Supp. 843. A Court of equity 
will never assume jurisdiction to prepare a decree dependent 
for its efficacy on the approval or rejection of some other 
coordinator or inferior board or tribunal, but only when it 
can enforce its decree. 
The Court would have to depend upon the efficacy of 
any injunctive relief in this case upon the inferior tribu-
nal of the State Tax Commission, the County Board of 
Equalization, the Auditor, Assessor, and Recorder. For 
these reasons, Granite's request should be denied. 
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POINT X 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING COUNTIES 
EQUITABLE COUNTERCLAIM WHEN THE FACTS 
RELATING TO THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT OF 
GRANITE WERE UNCONTROVERTED. 
The Trial Court specifically found that Granite was 
not unjustly enriched at the expense of Salt Lake County, 
even though the cost of collecting, apportioning, and 
distributing tax monies for Granite exceeded the amount paid 
for such services (T-427). 
During the years 1973 thorugh 1977, Salt Lake 
County expended $1,133,415.00 more to collect Granite's 
share of taxes than it received from Granite. This evidence 
was not disputed by Granite. 
Granite's Alias Second Amended Complaint and 
County's Counterclaim are both based upon the equitable 
theory of unjust enrichment. The County proved that Granite 
has been unjustly enriched at its expense. Granite failed 
to prove unjust enrichment of the County at Granite's 
expense. Since Granite sought equity, it likewise should be 
compelled to do equity. See Carbon Canal Company v. Sanpete 
Water User's Assocation, 425 P2d 405 (1967). For the Trial 
Court to deny Salt Lake County's Counterclaim when the evi-
dence was uncontroverted " ••• would do violence to the 
-46-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
well-known maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity." 
Glenn v. Player, 326 P2d 717 (1958). 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the 
Trial Court's judgment denying Salt Lake County equitable 
relief on its counterclaim should be reversed and judgment 
should be entered in favor of County on its Counterclaim and 
against Granite. 
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CONCLUSION 
County respectfully submits that the decision of 
the Trial Court was correct insofar as it concluded that 
Salt Lake County had not been unjustly enriched at the 
expense of Granite School District and should therefore be 
affirmed. However, the evidence was uncontroverted that 
Granite School District has been unjustly enriched by more 
than $1,000,000.00 at the expense of all Salt Lake County 
taxpayers. This inequity should be remedied. Judgment 
should be awarded in favor of County on its Counterclaim 
against Granite for the reasons set forth in County's Brief, 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of March, 1981. 
By·./;t.~~~~'lJL_~~~~~~ 
il ho as Peters 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Respondents, Cross-Appellants 
400 Chancellor Building 
220 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7575 
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